Abstract-This paper aims to accommodate games in which the players' dynamics are subject to un-modeled and disturbance terms. The un-modeled and disturbance terms are regarded as extended states for which observers are designed to estimate them. Compensating the players' dynamics with the observed values, the control laws are designed to achieve the robust seeking of the Nash equilibrium for networked games. Firstly, we consider the case in which the players' dynamics are subject to bounded disturbances only. In this case, the seeking strategy is developed by employing a smooth observer based on the Proportional-Integral (PI) control. By utilizing the designed strategy, we show that the players' actions would converge to a small neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the ultimate bound can be adjusted to be arbitrarily small by tuning the control gains. Then, we further consider the case in which both an un-modeled term and a disturbance term coexist in the players' dynamics. In this case, we adapt the idea from the Robust Integral of the Sign of the Error (RISE) method in the strategy design to achieve the asymptotic seeking of the Nash equilibrium. Both strategies are analytically investigated via the Lyapunov stability analysis. The applications of the proposed methods for a network of velocity-actuated vehicles are discussed. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed methods is verified via conducting numerical simulations.
to external disturbance and imprecise microfabrication, the control strategy designed for the MEMS gyroscope should take the parameter variations, the mechanical-thermal noises and the axes mechanical couplings into account [10] . To compensate for the effects of imprecise microfabrication and external disturbance, an Active Disturbance Rejection Control (ADRC) based strategy was adapted for the control of MEMS gyroscope in [10] . Moreover, physical hydraulic systems were trapped by uncertain parameters (e.g., hydraulic and payload unknown parameters) and external disturbances [11] . Gear shifting and tank pressure resulted in disturbance and varying parameters in the regenerative braking torque control of the air hybrid vehicles [12] . Moreover, it's a challenging task to get the accurate model information for the pneumatic muscle actuators. To address the un-modeled complexities, an ADRC-based control strategy was proposed for the pneumatic muscle actuator systems in [13] . Hydrodynamic damping forces and the working environments, that the autonomous marine surface vessels suffer, gave rise to un-modeled dynamics and unpredictable disturbances for the tracking control of marine surface vessels [14] . Motivated by the fact that un-modeled dynamics and disturbances are practically ubiquitous, this paper considers the robust Nash equilibrium computation for games in which there are un-modeled dynamics and time-varying disturbances in the players' dynamics.
Robust Nash equilibrium seeking problems were considered in [7] [8] [9] . The authors in [7] considered Nash equilibrium computation for generalized convex games. In particular, the robustness of the Nash equilibrium computing method towards the changes of the network topologies as well as the transmission delays was investigated. However, the players were considered to be static players whose action updating strategies can be arbitrarily designed. In [8] , the robustness of the consensus-based Nash computation algorithm towards the switching of the communication topology among the players was explored. In addition, robust analysis for the loss of communication was conducted. Given that the lengths of the time slots, in which the communication among the players was lost, were bounded by certain value, the method can still achieve Nash seeking under certain conditions [8] . In [9] , we investigated the robustness of the Nash equilibrium computation method towards bounded disturbances. It was proven in [9] that by utilizing the real-time measurements of the players' payoff values, the designed method ensured that the equilibrium point was ultimately bounded. Noticing that each player's objective function might be determined by all the engaged players' actions, we investigate distributed robust Nash equilibrium computation in which the players are supposed to have restrictive accesses into the other players' actions.
Compared with the distributed seeking algorithms in [1] , this paper accommodates the un-modeled complexities and time-varying disturbances in the system dynamics. The unmodeled dynamics bring couplings among all the players' dynamics, thus making the problem much more challenging. Moreover, the closed-loop system becomes a nonautonomous system under time-varying disturbances while the closed-loop systems in [1] are autonomous. Besides, this paper differs from [9] as only local communication among the players is required in the proposed methods, which benefits their applications in distributed systems. In addition, only a bounded disturbance term was addressed in [9] while in this paper, we consider both time-varying disturbances and un-modeled dynamics. In contrast to the bounded convergence result in [9] , this paper proposes a method that can achieve robust asymptotic equilibrium seeking in distributed networks. In summary, the main contributions of the paper are given in threefold:
1) The robust Nash equilibrium seeking problem is considered for games under distributed communication networks. In the considered problem, there exist unmodeled complexities and time-varying disturbances in the players' dynamics. In the proposed methods, the uncertainties in the system dynamics are regarded as extended states, for which a PI-based observer and a RISE-based observer are adapted. Based on the designed observers, two distributed robust Nash equilibrium seeking strategies are established. 2) The convergence results are theoretically established via conducting Lyapunov stability analysis. It is shown that driven by the PI-based algorithm, the players' actions would converge to a neighborhood of the equilibrium point. Moreover, the ultimate bound can be adjusted to be arbitrarily small by tuning the parameters. For the RISE-based method, it is theoretically proven that asymptotic convergence results are obtained.
3) The applications of the proposed methods for a network of velocity-actuated vehicles are discussed. In particular, the convergence results for the connectivity control game among the mobile sensors are established. We proceed the remainder of the paper in the following order. The preliminaries and notations are given in Section II. The problem is formulated in Section III. The main results are given in Section IV, where a PI-based method and a RISE-based method are developed. The applications of the proposed methods in sensors networks are discussed in Section V. A numerical example is given in Section VI for the verification of the proposed methods and the conclusions are drawn in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATIONS
In this paper, we use G = (V, E d ) to denote a communication graph. Note that V = {1, 2, · · · , M }, where M ≥ 2 and is an integer, defines the set of nodes in the graph and E d defines the set of edges for the nodes. The elements of E d are (i, j), which represents for an edge from node i to node j. Associate with (i, j) ∈ E d a weight a ji > 0 and a ii = 0. If a ij = a ji , ∀i, j ∈ V, we say that G is undirected. A matrix with its element on the ith row and jth column being a ij (a ij > 0 if (j, i) ∈ E d , else, a ij = 0) is the adjacency matrix of graph G and is termed as A. Given that there is a path between any pair of distinct vertices, the undirected graph is connected. Define D as a diagonal matrix whose ith diagonal element is M j=1 a ij . Then, the Laplacian matrix L is equal to D − A [1] [19] .
Notations: The concatenated vector form of
successively. The minimum and maximum eigenvalues of a symmetric positive definite matrix P are denoted as λ min (P ) and λ max (P ), respectively. Moreover, the minimum element and maximum element of h i for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N } are denoted as min{h i } and max{h i }, respectively. The notation
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this paper, we consider a game with N players in which player i intends to
where x i ∈ R, u i and f i (x) are the action, the control input and the objective function of player i, respectively.
Note that g i (x) and d i (t) respectively denote the un-modeled term and the external disturbance whose explicit expressions are unknown. The parameter ς is equal to 0 or 1. In the rest of the paper, these two cases will be investigated successively. The paper aims to design the control inputs to achieve the robust computation of the Nash equilibrium under the conditions that each player can not directly access all the other players' actions and the pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists.
Note that Nash equilibrium is defined as follows.
Remark 1: In this paper,
where ς = 0 or ς = 1. In contrast,
in [1] . Note that in (3), g i (x) is an un-modeled term whose explicit expression is unknown and d i (t) is an unknown timevarying disturbance. Moreover, as g i (x) is a function of x, it brings couplings among the players' dynamics thus making the problem more challenging. Adopted from [1] [3], the subsequent commonly used assumptions will be utilized in the upcoming sections.
There exists a positive constant m such that for x, z ∈ R N ,
where
Assumption 3:
The players are equipped with an undirected and connected communication graph G.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we firstly consider the case in which the players' dynamics are subject to external disturbance only, followed by the case in which the players' dynamics are subject to both an un-modeled term and a disturbance term.
A. Strategy design with a smooth state observer
In this section, we concern with games in which player i's action is given byẋ
where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N }. The disturbance term d i (t) is supposed to satisfy the following condition.
Assumption 4:
To further proceed to the strategy design, let z i = d i (t). Then, the dynamics of player i can be written aṡ
By regarding the external disturbance as an extended-state, the control law is designed as
in which
T and y ij ,ẑ i are generated bẏ
Moreover,k i1 = σk i1 ,k i2 = σ 2 k i2 , θ ij = θθ ij where σ, θ are positive parameters to be determined and θ ij , k i1 , k i2 are fixed positive constants.
Remark 2: As the players' dynamics are subject to timevarying disturbances, the main idea is to employ an observer to estimate the disturbance and then compensate it in the control law. Hence,ẑ i can be regarded as the observed disturbance. Moreover, as the players do not have direct access into the actions of the players who are not their neighbors, this paper follows our previous works in [1] [3] to estimate the requested information by utilizing consensus protocols.
Define
then,ζ
Hence,ζ
The following lemma is given for further facilitation of the closed-loop system analysis.
Proof: To facilitate the proof, leṫ
where w 1 , w 2 ∈ R are the system states.
Moreover, define
Then,V
Hence,V ≤ 0 andV = 0 if and only if w 1 = 0. Recalling
we obtain thatẇ
atV = 0. Therefore,V = 0 if and only if w 1 = 0 and w 2 = 0, which indicates that the origin is globally asymptotically stable for the system in (14) . Hence, by Theorem 4.5 in [18] , the matrix Ξ is Hurwitz.
Based on Lemma 1, the following result can be obtained. 
given that
T and t 0 is the initial time instant.
Proof:
σ . Then, it follows from (13) thatζ
, 2, · · · , N } are Hurwitz. Therefore, −∆ is Hurwitz by Lemma 1 and there exist symmetric positive definite matrices P 1 , Q 1 such that
according to Theorem 4.6 in [18] . According to (20) , the evolution ofζ is independent of η and ξ. Hence, define
Then, there exists a positive constant l 1 such thaṫ
By further noticing that
it follows from Theorem 4.19 in [18] that
whereβ ∈ KL.
Hence, for any
, there exists a positive constant T ≥ t 0 such that
Recalling the definition ofζ, we can obtain that
To analyze the evolution of η and ξ, define
and P is a symmetric positive definite matrix that satisfies
where Q is a symmetric positive definite matrix [8] . Then, forφ, whereφ
T , that belongs to a sufficiently large compact set D that contains the origin,
where l i , ∀i ∈ {3, 4, · · · , 6} are positive constants by utilizing the conditions in Assumptions 1-2.
4mλmin(Q) . Hence,
Moreover,
(33) Choose r such that B r ∈ D and
Then, for ||φ(t 0 )|| ≤ (min{λmin(P),
r, there exists a
and
according to Theorem 4.18 in [18] . Hence, if T ≤ T 1 , we have
Moreover, if T > T 1 , we have
(
Recalling that for t > T , ||ζ 2 (t)|| ≤ l2 σ , we arrive at the conclusion.
Following the results in Theorem 1, the following corollary can be derived. for all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N } are globally Lipschitz, the proof in Theorem 1 holds for any initial condition.
Remark 3: In Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, we establish the convergence results for the proposed method in (8)- (9) and show that the proposed method can drive the players' actions to an arbitrarily small neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium by tuning the control parameters. In the following section, we will propose an asymptotic seeker that can accommodate both the un-modeled complexities and time-varying disturbances in the system dynamics.
B. Strategy design with an asymptotic state observer
In this section, we consider the Nash equilibrium seeking problem in whichẋ
To accommodate the un-modeled and disturbance term, let z i = g i (x) + d i (t). Then, the dynamics of player i can be written asẋ
To seek for the Nash equilibrium, let
in
Remark 4: The proposed method is motivated by [15] in which the unknown dynamics and disturbances are observed based on the RISE method (see, e.g., [15] [16] [17] ). Compared with the strategy in Section IV-A, we see that the main difference is that a signum function is further included in the seeking strategy to achieve better convergence results.
To proceed the subsequent analysis, define the error signals as
Then,
Writing the error systems in the concatenated vector form gives the observation error subsystem aṡ
the optimization error subsystem aṡ
and the consensus error subsystem aṡ
To facilitate the subsequent analysis, define a filtered signal as γ =ζ 1 + cζ 1 .
Assumption 5: The functions g i (x) for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N } are continuously differentiable. Moreover,
given that x is bounded. Moreover, the disturbances d i (t) for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N } are sufficiently smooth andḋ i (t),d i (t) are bounded for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N }, t ≥ t 0 .
Denote
T . Then, the following theorem can be obtained. 
given that ||E f (t 0 )|| ≤ v 1 . Proof: To facilitate the closed-loop system analysis, define
(58) Moreover, for E f that belongs to a compact set D that contains the origin,
for some positive constant l 1 based on Assumption 1. Furthermore,
for some positive constants l 2 , l 3 and l 4 based on Assumption 1. Therefore, for E f that belongs to the compact set,
by noticing that for E f that belongs to the compact set,
for all i, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N } are bounded according to Assumption 5, and there are positive constant l 5 , l 6 such that
Noticing that γ =ζ 1 + cζ, we have,
Therefore,
(67) where ǫ 1 , ǫ 2 , ǫ 3 are positive constants that can be arbitrarily chosen.
Hence, choose ǫ 1 , ǫ 2 to be sufficiently small such that
> 0 and for fixed ǫ 1 , ǫ 2 , ǫ 3 choose k s i to be sufficiently large such that λ min (k s ) − > 0. Then, there exists a positive constant ǫ 3 such thaṫ
, then V 3 ≥ 0 by following the proof of Lemma 5 in [16] . If this is the case, recalling the definition of V , we have
Furthermore,V is negative semi-definite and from (68), ψ is bounded for t ∈ [t 0 , ∞). Therefore, according to (65), ζ 2 is bounded, from which we can further conclude thatζ 1 andζ 2 are bounded according to (50). Moreover, by (54) and (52), we can derive thatγ andη are also bounded. Lastly, by utilizing (51), it's easy to verify thatẋ andẍ are bounded.
Recalling thaṫ
It can be easily verified thatV is bounded. Hence, by the Babalat's Lemma, ||ψ|| → 0 as t → ∞. Recalling that ζ 2 = γ + k s ζ 1 , we arrive at the conclusion.
Remark 5:
Compared with the results in Section IV-A, we see that by utilizing the RISE-based method, asymptotic convergence results can be obtained though the system dynamics are subject to both uncertainties (i.e., g i (x)) and disturbances (i.e., d i (t)).
V. APPLICATION TO VELOCITY-ACTUATED MOBILE SENSOR NETWORKS
In [20] , the authors defined a connectivity control game for a network of mobile sensor networks. By supposing that the sensors try to find a tradeoff between the local objective (e.g., source seeking, positioning) and the global objective (e.g., preserve connectivity with the other sensors), the cost function of sensor i is defined as [20] 
T ∈ R 2 denotes the position of sensor i, r ii , r i , b i , c ij are constant matrix or vectors of compatible dimension and N i denotes the neighboring set of sensor i in the communication graph. In addition, for each i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N }, r ii is symmetric positive definite and strictly diagonally dominant. The objective function in (73) can be treated as a cost that motivates the sensors to keep connectivity with their neighbors. However, in this paper, we consider the following global objective:
where N p i denotes the physical neighboring set of sensor i. This basically means that if sensor j ∈ N p i , then, the objective function of sensor i depends on the position of
In the following, we consider a network of sensors in which sensor i's objective function is
Suppose that the sensors' dynamics are governed bẏ
and the control strategies are given in (8)- (9) (by directly adapting u i ,ẑ i ,x i therein to two-dimensional column vectors). Then, the following corollary holds. Corollary 2: Suppose that Assumptions 3-4 are satisfied. Then, for any positive constant v 1 , there exist positive constants θ * , σ * such that for each θ ∈ (θ * , ∞), σ ∈ (σ * , ∞), there exists a constantT ≥ t 0 such that
, and c ij > 0 if j ∈ N p i . Then, it can be easily seen that R is strictly diagonally dominant with its diagonal elements being positive as r ii is symmetric positive definite and strictly diagonally dominant. Therefore, there are symmetric positive definite matrices Γ 1 , Γ 2 that satisfy
according to the Gershgorin Circle Theorem and Theorem 4.6 in [18] .
The rest of the proof follows the proof of Theorem 1 with V 2 therein replaced by
and hence, we omit the details here. Corollary 2 considers the sensor connectivity game by supposing that the sensors' dynamics are subject to timevarying disturbances. In the following, we consider the case in which the sensors' dynamics are given bẏ
and the control strategies are given in (43)-(44) (by directly adapting u i ,ẑ i ,x i therein to two-dimensional column vectors). Then, the following result can be obtained. 
given that ||E(t 0 )|| ≤ v 1 .
Proof:
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 2 by replacing V 4 therein with
where Γ 1 is defined in the proof of Corollary 2.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we consider a network of 5 players equipped with the communication graph given in Fig. 1 . In the following, we will simulate the connectivity control game and a non-quadratic game, successively. 
The game has a unique Nash equilibrium on which x * ij = − 1 2
for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5}, j ∈ {1, 2}.
In the following, we will firstly simulate the case in which the sensors' dynamics are subject to disturbances only, followed by the case in which the sensors' dynamics are subject to both un-modeled terms and time-varying disturbances.
1) Sensors subject to external disturbances in their dynamics:
Suppose that the sensors' dynamics are given bẏ
and the external disturbance of sensor i is a sinusoidal function that is of amplitude i and frequency i. T , the simulation results are given in Figs. 2-4 by utilizing the method in (8)- (9) . From Fig. 2 , it can be concluded that the sensors' positions converge to a small neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium. The position observation errors and the disturbance observation errors are given in Figs. 3-4 from which we see that the error signals converge to a small neighborhood of zero. Hence, the effectiveness of the proposed method in (8)- (9) is verified. 
2) Sensors subject to both un-modeled and disturbance terms in their dynamics:
In this section, we suppose thaṫ
In the dynamics of x ij for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5}, j ∈ {1, 2}, the un-modeled and disturbance terms (i.e., g i (x) + d i (t)) are sin(t) + x 21 , sin(t) + x 22 , 2 sin(2t) + x 
B. Games with non-quadratic cost functions
Example 2: The example settings are the same as those in Example 1 except that T .
1) Games with disturbances in the players' dynamics:
The simulation settings are the same as those in Section VI-A.1. The simulation results produced by the method in (8)- (9) are given in Figs. 8-10 . Fig. 8 illustrates the players' actions from which we see that the players' actions are driven to a small neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the observation errors tend to zero as shown in Figs. 9-10. The simulation results verify the theoretical result in Theorem 1.
2) Games with un-modeled and disturbance terms in the players' dynamics: In this section, the simulation settings follow those in Section VI-A. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper considers robust Nash equilibrium seeking for games in which there are un-modeled and disturbance terms in the players' dynamics. To accommodate the un-modeled and disturbance terms, two extended-state observers are introduced into the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking strategy. The first observer is based on PI control. By utilizing the PI-based observer, it is shown that the proposed method can drive the players' actions to a small neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium. Moreover, to further enhance the convergence result, a RISE-based observer is employed in the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking strategy. By Lyapunov stability analysis, it is proven that the method can drive the players' actions to the Nash equilibrium asymptotically under certain conditions. Lastly, the proposed method is applied to the connectivity control of mobile sensor networks.
